Because of the blow to the grass-roots and front-line employees, everyone has to play a ball game, and the work can be pushed, and the attitude can be bad. Angry classmates all have diarrhea at work. The newly recruited college students have bad looks and much lower wages. When the old guy knew it, he pretended not to understand and refused to teach classics, making the inexperienced newcomer feel that he was still alive, so he simply patted his ass and left. This makes them nervous.
The leader pulled a long face all day and sent all his anger from above to below. Every time they have a meeting, they threaten their employees, saying that if they don't obey, they will let you be laid off and won't hire you for living expenses. What's more, one minute late, they will deduct 50 yuan's money. However, the financial affairs of administrative affairs are never open and meticulous. Because the distribution is too wide, everyone feels that many leaders suffer because they have not completed the task, so they feel at ease and don't want to complete the task. This is equivalent to a salary cut, because by the end of the year, only 40% of others were tied to the task, and now those who are on the job don't get much more than those who are not on the job, so the leaders began to let those who were postponed come back to work, and those who retired plausibly said: You kicked us out, and you will never come back to work, and you will support us!
In this regard, we can see that the reform of banks is not very successful, so accidents are still frequent. The middle-level leaders are not good, and they go back to the leaders for everything, and the leaders are also angry. Don't underestimate the consequences of being deprived of benefits. Don't think that paying a high salary to the middle class can keep people. Not necessarily, the key is that all the people served are not used or the salary distribution design is unreasonable. Now employees of state-owned banks are counting their own pieces all day long, and it is more comfortable for customers to simply pull eggs when they find out.
Published on July 26th, 2005 1:44 AM | Comments (2)
July, 2005 1 1, Jiangsu sample survey of bank reform in China: personnel and organizational changes.
/jj/2005 07 07/DD/200507060047 . ASP
Compared with banks in the province, Wuxi Branch has a special practice, that is, 80% of posts below the middle level are selected in two ways, and 20% are employed by competition. Guo Xijun explained: "The main reason is to maintain the relative stability of personnel and business. After all, the business substitution of different departments of the bank is relatively poor. " In terms of business process reform, Wuxi Branch abolished the accounting department, capital planning department, security department and other departments, and set up the planning and finance department, operation department and other departments.
Look at the above practice, hehe.
Published in @ July 2005, 1 1, 12:23 AM | Comments (0)
2005-05-24 Inflation pressure has not been fundamentally alleviated, and RMB appreciation is the biggest economic lie today.
BEIJING, April 24 (Xinhua) The "Blue Book of Economics, Spring Issue" recently released by China Academy of Social Sciences predicts that the growth rate of GDP in 2005 will be lower than that of the previous year, about 8.9%; The scale of fixed assets investment in the whole society will reach 8.44 trillion yuan, and the continuous and obvious upward trend of GDP ratio should be highly valued; Consumption will still maintain steady growth; Various price levels are still rising, and inflationary pressure cannot be ignored.
Inflation itself is a sign that the currency continues to fall. At this time, asking the currency to "appreciate" is like asking a patient who is too worried about eating and drinking to eat and drink more to get better. Can only appear in fables People know that we can't rise and ask us to appreciate. The purpose is to ask us to recognize the devaluation of the RMB and adjust the exchange rate between the RMB and the US dollar.
China's economic growth is driven by government investment, which is the result of abnormal development. Therefore, the unstable economic situation is the internal cause of China's fear of appreciation!
Personally, it is an indisputable fact that the RMB has been depreciating. You only need to look at the state's capital injection into several banks in recent years to know the seriousness of the problem.
Published on May 24th, 2005 12: 18 | Comments (0)
On May 20, 2005, some opinions on the shareholding system reform of state-owned banks (reposted)
Qiu Zhenkang (estimated to be a pseudonym, seeking truth and being well-off? )
The success or failure of the reform of state-owned banks is related to the security of China's financial industry and the development of the whole national economy. People all over the country pay close attention to and expect this, and the State Council has also given strong support. After two years of hard work, the main indicators of the two pilot banks are close to the level of internationally developed banks, which is gratifying. However, the fundamental purpose of listing is to improve the corporate governance structure, promote the transformation of operating mechanism and improve internal strength to meet the needs of external competition. It is precisely on this core issue that the employees of state-owned banks have not experienced more changes, and their business philosophy and operation methods are basically the same, and the content seriously lags behind the form. The so-called "reborn" reform that they can't afford to lose has not yet touched the skin. Some deep-seated contradictions and problems that have restricted the development of banks for a long time should arouse our great attention.
I. On the issue of non-performing assets
In order to ensure the successful listing of two state-owned banks, at the beginning of 2004, the state spared no effort to use huge foreign exchange reserves to inject capital into China Construction Bank and China Construction Bank. In addition, the NPL ratios of the two banks dropped to 3.08% and 5.46% respectively at the end of September 2004, which inspired the whole country. Just after the New Year, the media reported the news that the NPL ratio of the two banks rebounded. Outsiders don't understand, say. At present, it is in the critical period of listing, from the central bank to the banking regulatory bureau, from the head office of state-owned commercial banks to the sub-branches, all levels require that a large number of non-performing assets should not appear, and the work of compressing non-performing assets is unprecedented, but contrary to expectations, non-performing assets continue to emerge. In my opinion, the usual administrative order means to reduce non-performing assets can only be a stopgap measure, and it cannot fundamentally solve the problem. We should learn from Dayu's strategy of water control, which should be "sparse" rather than "blocked" Blockage will eventually lead to flooding. We should start with the basic work and deeply reflect on the reasons in the mechanism. Quite simply, in the old society, private banks and bank bosses had neither modern education nor diplomas, and even were illiterate. The banks they run rarely have non-performing assets, and their share capital has grown from small to large, developing into a very influential local bank. Are modern bankers inferior to them? As for the reasons for the formation of non-performing assets, at present, the official view is that objective reasons are the main reasons, and the reasons for banks' own operations are secondary, accounting for only about one fifth. If this estimate is true, then the social environment and credit environment of banks have not changed significantly before and after 2003. Why will there be ups and downs since then? If the decline of non-performing assets is the result of the efforts of state-owned banks, then banks did not relax their work in this area before 2003. I think the analysis of non-performing assets should be divided into two different periods. Before 2000, bad debts and bad debts formed under the planned economy were concentrated in banks. During this period, it experienced several large-scale economic overheating and several activities to clean up "triangular debts", which directly or indirectly formed a large number of non-performing assets of banks. If this part is mainly caused by the general environment, the bank's own responsibility is secondary, and everyone can understand. It's not the same after 2000. At this time, the commercialization reform of state-owned banks has been going on for 10 years, and the financial awareness of the whole society has been generally strengthened and improved. In particular, the phenomenon of forcing banks to lend money has been curbed to a great extent, and the social environment in which banks operate has changed greatly. If objective reasons were the main reasons for non-performing loans in the past, then today's banks should not have a large number of non-performing assets, but this is not the case. The following figures can illustrate the problem: at the beginning of 2000, the four major state-owned commercial banks divested 654.38+0.4 trillion non-performing assets from non-performing assets companies. At that time, the official average non-performing assets ratio of the four major banks was 6%, which was among the good banks compared with the international ones. The remaining non-performing assets are about 500 billion yuan. It was only three years by the end of 2002, excluding the pre-tax profits written off by four banks. The total amount of non-performing assets was 2.088 billion yuan, and the non-performing rate was 26.92%, which was basically the same as before 2000. On the basis of summing up decades of experience and lessons, we have taken a series of remedial measures, and it took us three years to complete the decades-long deterioration process, which is really thought-provoking. If we simply look for reasons from the bank's own operation, we can summarize them as follows:
1, stripping off non-performing assets for the first time, resulting in serious moral hazard, which provided sufficient ideological preparation for the emergence of non-performing assets later. The divestiture of a large number of non-performing assets, as a grass-roots bank, has got rid of the heavy historical burden and its operating conditions have improved rapidly. Various business indicators have multiplied several times overnight. According to the existing internal assessment mechanism of banks, units can get more performance pay, and cadres can be promoted and reused, earning both fame and fortune. What is even more encouraging is that some work responsibilities and case clues in the process of forming non-performing assets have been written off with the stripping, and units and individuals have gone into battle lightly. Objectively speaking, this mechanism means that banks with more non-performing assets will be stripped off, and cadres and workers in banks will get more benefits, which is undoubtedly a great reward and encouragement for units and cadres with more non-performing loans. On the contrary, there are also some leading cadres of grass-roots branches or sub-branches, who are usually cautious in their work style and have few non-performing assets. In addition, their understanding of the divestiture policy is not deep. They always think that the bank's assets are hard to come by, and it is a pity to divest them. Therefore, for those who have the hope of revitalizing and promoting transformation, try to take preservation measures and not divest them in time. It should be said that this is a more responsible attitude, but it is precisely this kind of people who don't use it enough. The so-called assessment mechanism of rewarding diligence and punishing laziness has fundamentally reversed the problem of asset divestiture. Social existence determines social consciousness, and the cold reality makes all bankers smart. They fully and profoundly realize that the divestiture of non-performing assets is not only a shortcut to improve their own business conditions, but also a magic weapon to improve their personal career destiny, so they are full of expectations for the second divestiture. Although it was said at that time that it was the last free "lunch", no one believed that it was the last time, but craned its neck and waited for the free "dinner" with an empty stomach. Many things happen. In 2000-2002, the central bank relatively relaxed the monitoring of non-performing assets, and all grass-roots banks aimed at the opportunity and took action when the time was ripe. Non-performing assets rose to 26.92% as quickly as volcanic eruption, and its reliability is questionable. Since 2004, the banking regulatory bureau and the central bank have stepped up the monitoring of non-performing assets, and the non-performing assets have disappeared quietly. It's understandable that outsiders don't understand why they come and go in a hurry and for no reason.
2. The internal assessment mechanism of the bank unconsciously contributed to the generation of non-performing loans.
95 years ago, the internal assessment of state-owned banks' business objectives was mainly speed and scale, that is, the amount of deposits. After 1995, we began to evaluate the benefits. At present, the three main indicators of deposit, income and risk are all based on a natural year as an assessment cycle. As a grass-roots bank, the most convenient and effective way to complete the above three indicators within one working year is to increase loans, which will generate deposits and attract customers; Increased benefits; At the same time, it also reduced the non-performing loan ratio; You can kill three birds with one stone. Although the loan also has risks, its risks are lagging behind and cannot be reflected in the assessment period. As long as the loans are continuously increased, the tasks are completed, the established development speed is maintained, the risks are covered up, and the non-performing loans are diluted. Since the loan is the main means to complete the task, I don't know why the assessment at all levels has not regarded the loan amount as the subsidy for the task completion of the grass-roots bank, which objectively stimulated the loan demand of the grass-roots bank. Because the total loan amount is controlled by the index, it changes the way of increasing bank acceptance bills, making a large number of acceptance bills become project investment; If the approval authority of fixed assets loans is improved, it will become a working capital loan for enterprises, further solidifying a large number of working loans and increasing new risks; Corporate loans are more complicated, so personal loans are increased. As the superior bank has not yet issued the personal loan management measures, it decided to report to the superior bank for approval, and set the maximum personal loan period as 20 years. If there are risks, it will be 20 years later, but the income generated by loans is inexhaustible for contemporary people. Under the constraint of this short-term behavior mechanism, it is very difficult to ensure the quality of loans under extremely impulsive environmental conditions.
3. The internal risk control mechanism of banks is weak in restraining non-performing loans.
Since 2000, banks have taken a series of preventive measures to prevent loan risks. First, the working organization of credit management has been strengthened, from the original credit management department to three, forming a credit operation department, a credit approval department and a risk management department, as well as a credit management Committee with more than three departments; Secondly, the division of labor among the three ministries and one committee was clarified, and several firewalls were set up. Business departments cannot participate in loan approval, and approval departments cannot meet with enterprises. The Risk Department is responsible for dynamic and timely monitoring, which was called "dry, watch and decide" at that time. Third, there are layers of authorization. The head office and secondary branches also have four accounting units and four credit management teams, all of which have different contents and different limits of approval authority. No one can cross the line. This is really an iron wall. But three years later, the ruthless reality is so disappointing and frustrating. Why? The rules and regulations of banks themselves are impeccable, but not many of them are actually put in place. This is the greatest sorrow, because China is a society ruled by men. As long as people's ideas are inconsistent, there will be no insurmountable policy obstacles, especially in the placement of bank loans. As the leader of grass-roots banks, if they want to pass a loan, they will be inspired directly or indirectly from the pre-loan investigation and demonstration, and the obedient managers will get the message and be ignorant of the current affairs. To say the least, even if the leader didn't give instructions in advance, a suggestive speech at the meeting was daunting enough, and even a look could change the research results of the meeting. What pre-lending investigation, evaluation and argumentation, collective research, * * * decision-making, mutual restriction and * * * responsibility are all weak under the current banking system. Therefore, after 2000, so many departments were added in the bank to strengthen the management of loans, the number of personnel increased several times, and huge costs were invested. The actual effect is the same as in the past. The good intentions of higher-level banks have not been implemented, and the real loan decision-making power is still in the hands of several people. The same loan, the same enterprise, if you want to borrow, you can give several reasons, if you want to borrow, you can also pull out a train, which is more arbitrary and reckless. Before 2000, the responsibility for making mistakes in loan decisions was very clear: there was only one credit department and one president. Now it is different, because loans are collective research, the same decision, several departments and several personnel are responsible. Finally, as long as the loan procedures meet the requirements, no one is responsible. In particular, the projects recommended by the grassroots should be reported to the superior bank or a higher bank for examination and approval. Because the examination and approval bank is far from the project location, it can only keep its mouth shut from the aspects of industrial policy and project layout. Everyone is happy to pass a project. When a project is rejected, it is criticized by subordinate banks or enterprises, but they don't understand the situation, don't support the business development of grass-roots banks, and there are a lot of fees. Grass-roots units are determined to report rejected projects again while accusing the approving bank, and the reasons are more sufficient. In the face of persistent enthusiasm, ordinary projects can be passed several times. Therefore, the operation mechanism of layer-by-layer approval has very limited practical effect on ensuring asset quality. However, it unconsciously assumed the responsibility of approving non-performing assets for the grassroots, making the grassroots more fearless.
To sum up, the employment mechanism, performance appraisal mechanism and loan decision-making mechanism within the bank are the important reasons leading to non-performing assets. In this regard, if there is no major surgery, in the words of an economist, five years ago and five years later, there will be no different results.
Second, about the non-tradable shares.
Equity reform is the core of bank restructuring. Only by transforming the equity into a real individual capital can the interests of shareholders and the company be effectively linked, and the existing drawbacks of banks can be solved. This is the hope of bank reengineering and everyone's understanding. In 2004, two pilot wholly state-owned banks set up state-controlled joint-stock companies, and established the company's board of directors and board of supervisors. The change of state-owned banks' equity laid the foundation for the listing of banks. However, this change is only formal. Individual capital, where Changjiang Electric Power, State Grid, Baosteel Group and China Construction Bank invest and build banks, has no money, all of them are state-owned and cannot be truly personalized. As the head of the family, the chairman is the embodiment of the enterprise. He can ignore the party discipline and state laws, dare to risk his personal political life and do things that harm the interests and reputation of enterprises. What's more, can other employees behave themselves? This is unimaginable in the true sense of joint-stock companies at all times and in all countries, which reflects the actual effect of this joint-stock reform from one side. This form of equity participation is not uncommon in listed companies in previous years, and the effect is also very general. We might as well review the history of Bank of Communications. When 1908 was founded, Hong Kong Bank of Communications was a fully financial joint-stock company. After liberation, the Bank of Communications in Hong Kong also occupied a place among many financial enterprises. When China resumed Bank of Communications on 1987, its share capital was initiated by the central finance, local finance and corporate legal person, which was basically the same as CCB and BOC. What is the result? After less than 20 years of dismal operation, not only the mechanism of our ancestors has not been inherited, but also the management methods of foreign banks have not been learned. The ills of state-owned banks are reflected in one, but they have become more state-owned. This is a lesson to be learned. Of course, at present, the equity reform of state-owned banks is only preliminary, and the real purpose is to realize equity transfer through listing and finally realize individual capitalization. Under the current national conditions in China, it is impossible to achieve the goal in one step, which is understandable by all China people. Therefore, the pilot banks have been actively looking for strategic partners overseas since the beginning of the preparation for listing, and have not relaxed their work in this area for a day, but they have all ended in failure so far. As a market in China, it is very attractive to overseas consortia or financial institutions. Why not act rashly and keep a wait-and-see attitude? This shows that you have great distrust of the shareholding system reform of our bank. No wonder any kind of investment behavior is to obtain greater profits. There are two forms, one is to obtain partial control, and the other is to share dividends through equity participation. Under the current conditions, these two wishes are difficult to realize, because the state's holding position in state-owned banks is unshakable, and listing is only a small proportion of equity transfer. Even if you get a seat on the board of directors, the right to speak is insignificant; Want to share the bonus? First, from the perspective of listed companies in China, there are not many dividends on time. Second, it is not up to one or two directors to decide how to distribute dividends. Faced with the danger that equity investment will be swallowed up by huge amounts of non-performing assets at any time, it is not difficult for investors to sit tight and wait and see. Therefore, the designers of the shareholding system reform of state-owned banks should be more liberated, bolder, faster and more diverse. The proportion of equity transfer should be further improved, and even giving up the controlling position of state-owned banks is not terrible. As long as we take this step bravely, the distance from real commercial banks may be shortened by 108 thousand miles. Throughout the past 30 years of reform and opening up, foreigners have benefited from China, while China people have gained greater benefits. At the beginning of China's entry into WTO, many people were worried that our national industry would be devastated by a catastrophic blow, which is unnecessary from the current point of view. The financial industry is related to the national economy and people's livelihood, and financial opening is an advanced form of the whole economic development. On the land of China, all wholly foreign-owned enterprises, holding companies and joint-stock enterprises should follow international practices and accept the supervision of government financial institutions. If it does not endanger the survival of domestic enterprises, it will not affect the development of the entire national economy. Looking back on the restructuring process of state-owned enterprises in the past ten years, when enterprises can still maintain normal operations or have certain profitability and development prospects, as the competent departments of enterprises, even local governments do not agree with the restructuring of enterprises and the change of ownership relations of enterprises. On the contrary, when the enterprise loses money year after year, the employees' wages can't be paid in time, and the debts are high and scarred, it is urged to reorganize and unload the burden as soon as possible, so as to get rid of it hastily, just like a person.
Third, about team building and salary.
State-owned banks have a large contingent of cadres and workers. At present, the total number of China Construction Bank and China Construction Bank is around 500,000, but it may actually be more, because temporary workers are an unclear number, which is really terrible compared with the international developed banks. Citibank has only 48,000 people in the world, which is one sixth of that of China Construction Bank, but its total assets are eight times that of China Construction Bank, and its per capita total assets are dozens of times that of China Construction Bank. Therefore, reducing staff and increasing efficiency and connecting with the international community have become the primary tasks of the bank's shareholding system reform. I think that under the planned economy system, many departments of state-owned banks are bloated. Only the party, government, industry, youth league, discipline inspection, supervision, publicity, logistics and other departments may be similar to the total number of foreign banks. It is appropriate to take advantage of the shareholding system reform to "reduce swelling and lose weight" for team building, but we can't make a simple numerical comparison. Foreign banks have economic environment and conditions suitable for their survival, and have strong management means and skills. Even in the branches of state-owned banks, we can find examples where the work efficiency is dozens of times different. The total amount of per capita financial resources in Shanghai, Guangzhou and underdeveloped western regions may be dozens of times different, but it cannot be said that the bank employees in the western region are inefficient and their tasks are not saturated, and they need to be reduced according to the standards of advanced regions. Reducing staff in state-owned banks is the most difficult and headache, and it is a patient and meticulous work. If it is to improve the quality of the team, it should be the survival of the fittest. Since there has been no scientific performance appraisal system since ancient times, the reduction of personnel can only be done in the most primitive, convenient and simple way, either according to a certain age or a certain length of service, as long as it is within the scope, what education and degree? Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China laid off a large number of employees. In 2003, about 1 100 senior managers were dismissed due to the personnel and incentive and restraint mechanism reform of China Construction Bank. As a team leaving the post, the age is generally between 40 and 50, which is lower than that of younger people in terms of cultural level. This is a fact that everyone admits. However, from the analysis of the actual work effect such as work experience and customer resources, it should not be worse than young people, and it may be even bigger from the contribution to state-owned banks. There are many people who have achieved careers at this age, both at home and abroad. The "one-size-fits-all" staff reduction measures only served the purpose of reducing staff, and did not touch the bloated organizational system of state-owned banks at all, nor did they optimize the ranks. On the contrary, it has brought serious negative effects. As former employees, they are still the young backbone of local government civil servants, and they have become ancient and rare old people in the ranks of banks. They have devoted the best time of their lives to state-owned banks, and their persistence, loyalty and enthusiasm for their cause have all been shattered. It was the same yesterday. They start with the monthly salary of 30 yuan Money, and when they leave their jobs, the total salary they get is equivalent to their salary for more than two years. No matter how noble and glorious their "heroic behavior" is, how significant and far-reaching, they all have a bitter feeling of being fooled and can't accept this harsh reality. Of course, the past has passed, and we don't need to relive their feelings in the horn. However, we must pay attention to the ideological pulse and mental state of future generations. The combat effectiveness of a team depends on ideological cohesion and centripetal force. The dependence between employees of foreign-funded enterprises and enterprises is extraordinary, and the feeling of home is extremely strong. This is what we need most. Faced with the personnel reform of bank listing and employee demotion, the "59-year-old phenomenon" that is widespread in society suddenly came 20 years ahead of schedule in the financial system. People under the age of 40 have been in a state of panic, feeling that the sun is going down, and those who have worked hard for the development of the banking industry have become difficult to be understood and recognized by everyone. The harsh reality made these people's thoughts begin to awaken. The director of Harbin Branch of China Bank, with less than 10 people, can sweep away more than one billion deposits overnight, which is not without historical background. We can buy out an employee who has worked in the bank for decades with 70 thousand yuan. How many banks can the huge sum of 654.38+0 billion buy out? We have created trillions of non-performing assets in three years, and it is more likely to buy them out by this standard. According to the bank's internal operating rules, as long as the above cases have post due diligence rules, it will be difficult to succeed, which shows how distracted the whole team is. He is just a bureau chief. If he is the president, he will surely make a more earth-shattering "feat". Therefore, while paying attention to social stability, personnel reform should pay more attention to the ideological stability of the team, which is the key to improving the combat effectiveness of the whole team.
The reform of salary system is another main content of the shareholding system reform of state-owned banks. Before 2003, the internal distribution mechanism of banks was basically average, and the department-level cadres in the original sense were similar to ordinary employees. Later, the title changed, the president became a senior manager and the section chief became a department manager. Wages rose overnight, and the performance pay difference between senior managers and ordinary employees was nearly 10 times. I don't advocate the principle of egalitarian distribution, but the gap is so big that it is staggering and beyond the psychological expectations of ordinary people. The reform of many contents in the history of state-owned banks has not been as rapid and silent as this salary reform, which may be because the leadership has reached a highly unprecedented agreement in ideological understanding. The reason for the reform is to be in line with foreign banks, because the senior management of foreign banks is particularly well treated. If we don't follow closely, our talents will be taken away by foreign banks, which is the most important theoretical basis to support the salary reform. Judging from the current medium-sized cities, we have not seen the shadow of foreign banks. Even in a few years, we don't know how many executives foreign banks need. But a few years ago, at the beginning of the establishment of some joint-stock banks in China, senior executives were taken away from state-owned banks. However, the senior management team of state-owned banks has not failed to receive talents, but talents and heroes have emerged in large numbers. Therefore, it is somewhat "alarmist" to worry that state-owned banks will be deserted if foreign banks enter. From the analysis of our bank executives, there are not many that can really make foreign banks drool, and it is indeed far-fetched to support the reform of salary system on this basis. We can't make mistakes when analyzing the quality of state-owned bank cadres, saying that he is of high quality, and even if his salary is 10 times, he is in danger of being taken away by foreign banks anytime and anywhere; It is not an attitude of dialectical materialism to say that his quality is low and he is worthless in his present post, and he is the object of elimination anytime and anywhere. It is true that the salary of foreign bank executives is indeed high, but the gap between foreign financial enterprises and other industries may be smaller than ours. In addition to the external environment, it is more important that foreign banks have huge interest support. Although state-owned banks have made considerable profits in recent years, they are essentially different from foreign banks. First, before the real interest rate marketization, the bank's profits have a certain monopoly nature, because the deposit-loan spread stipulated by the central bank can be about two percentage points higher than the international average, which can't be compared with foreign banks; Second, the bank's non-performing loan losses have not been deducted from the profits, and the potential risk losses have not been calculated. If this part is included, the state-owned banks not only have no profits, but even have huge deficits. Moreover, from the analysis of the internal causes of the formation of non-performing loans, it is not directly related to the job responsibilities of the vast majority of employees, and the responsibility is concentrated in the leadership. Therefore, the benefits of state-owned banks should not be used as a reason to raise management salaries and widen the wage gap. At present, the performance-based salary distribution of state-owned banks is actually to cash the post salary in the name of performance, which is not only unrelated to the operating performance, but also further intensifies the relationship between cadres and employees. When doing the ideological work of employees, a grassroots executive cadre once said the truth: "Don't think that the salary is low, and I can't use the money to recruit temporary workers from the society." It can be seen that the quality of executives has a strong sense of marketization. If we continue to think along this line, how much does it cost to hire an executive from the society? It is a pity that employees are pushed to the market, but they are left in the "infancy" of monopoly. In the final analysis, the restructuring and listing of state-owned banks is a highly market-oriented behavior, and the reform of bank compensation mechanism should follow the principle of marketization to determine the value of each post and employee, which is the inevitable trend of banking development. I don't know if it is.