20 19 is destined to be a year of corporate governance and shareholding. Faced with the sad market of small and medium-sized insurance companies, how many companies have the will and strength to take over an insurance company?
Happy life may be a window to observe the living conditions of small and medium-sized insurance companies.
"Loss King" was sold off.
On June 1 1, China Cinda announced that it planned to clear all the shares of Happy Life through the property rights exchange at or above the provincial level. From capital increase to equity liquidation, China Cinda's attitude towards a happy life has changed greatly.
China Cinda said that the transfer is a strategic choice made by Cinda around "highlighting its main business". The transfer of the equity of Happy Life will optimize the allocation of resources, effectively improve Cinda's capital adequacy ratio, optimize the asset structure and improve the efficiency of capital operation.
It is understood that Happy Life suffered a huge loss of 680 1 billion yuan in 20 18 years, making it the "loss king" with the largest loss among life insurance companies, with a cumulative loss of nearly 10 billion yuan in 10 years. Long-term hopeless profit may make China Cinda make such a decisive decision.
According to public information, Happy Life was established in June 2007 with a registered capital of165438+300 million yuan, and China Cinda holds 50.995% of the shares as the controlling shareholder. Sanpower Group Co., Ltd., Shenzhen Yihuite Technology Development Co., Ltd., Shaanxi Coal Industry and Chemical Industry Group Co., Ltd. and Shenzhen Tuotian Investment Management Co., Ltd. hold182%, 9.27 1%, 8. 185% and 7./kloc-respectively.
If China Cinda clears its equity, not only will the future equity of the largest shareholder account for 565,438+0%, but all or part of the equity of the second, third, fifth and sixth largest shareholders will also be uncertain.
According to public information, the equity of Happy Life held by the above shareholders was frozen or pledged. The frozen and pledged share capital accounts for 22.46% of the total share capital of Happy Life. If the 565,438+0% equity to be transferred by China Cinda is added, the 73.46% equity of Happy Life is uncertain.
Although not all pledged shares will eventually change hands, like the 14. 18% shares held by Sanpower Group, the second largest shareholder, it may be difficult to avoid the fate of "selling" in the end. In order to alleviate the liquidity crisis, Yuan Yafei, the actual controller of Sanpower Group, proposed a plan to slim down assets by 10 billion yuan, and planned to sell non-core assets one after another. At present, the shares of Happy Life held by Sanpower Group have been frozen or pledged.
Investment and underwriting failed.
As a national medium-sized life insurance company, Happy Life has achieved a nationwide layout. The company has 22 provincial branches and 244 branches at all levels in China, and the total assets of 20 18 are nearly 70 billion yuan. At present, Happiness Life Insurance is the only insurance company in China that provides housing for the aged.
However, in sharp contrast with abundant capital, the performance of a happy life is surprising. In the first eight years of its establishment, happy life has been in a state of loss.
According to the data, from 2009 to 20 14, the net profit of Happy Life was-245 million yuan,-450 million yuan,-737 million yuan, -79 1 billion yuan,-753 million yuan and-393 million yuan respectively, and the total loss in six years was 3.4 billion yuan.
Subsequently, thanks to the liberalization of investment channels of insurance funds, a considerable number of small and medium-sized life insurance companies embarked on the development model of asset-driven liabilities. Happy Life finally made its first profit in 20 15, with a net profit of 335 million yuan.
Unfortunately, the good times did not last long. With the adjustment of regulatory policies, universal insurance has come to an end, and the asset-driven liability model of small and medium-sized insurance companies has gradually come to an end. In 20 16 and 20 17, the performance of Happy Life declined sharply, and the net profit for the two years was only180,000 yuan and 49 million yuan respectively.
In 20 18, under the influence of the deep adjustment of the life insurance industry and the turbulence of the capital market, the business of Happy Life took a sharp turn for the worse, and neither investment nor underwriting worked, almost setting a loss record for China insurance companies. Happy Life became the worst insurance company of the year with a huge loss of 6.8 billion yuan, with a cumulative loss of 9.798 billion yuan in ten years.
The annual report of 20 18 shows that the investment income of Happy Life is only131200 million yuan, which is 74% lower than the 5.05 billion yuan in 20 17. The relevant person in charge of Happy Life attributed the huge loss performance to "the decline of the 20 18 equity market and the large-scale loss of the company's equity investment". At the same time of huge losses, its original premium income in that year also fell sharply, from 20 18184.75 million yuan to 20 18' s 965438+66 million yuan, down 50% year-on-year. In addition, happy life is also facing the dilemma of increasing surrender. In 20 18, its surrender premium expenditure was 9.07 billion yuan. By the end of June 2008, the surrender rate of Happy Life was as high as 2 1. 14%, far exceeding the level of peers.
Over-reliance on bancassurance is also the main problem facing Happy Life. The annual report shows that among the top five insurance products of Happy Life in 20 18, the four main sales channels are bancassurance.
Not only has it suffered losses year after year, Happy Life has also been issued a supervision letter by the regulatory authorities due to a series of problems such as imperfect capital utilization system, insufficient investment team personnel, and failure to conduct post-investment management as required, with a total penalty of 2.53 million yuan.
Eight capital increase is difficult to solve.
By combing the data, it is found that since the establishment of 12, Happiness Life has implemented eight capital increases, issued two capital supplementary bonds of 3 billion yuan, and 1 subordinated term debt of 495 million yuan.
During the period of 20 1 1-20 17, Happiness Life made capital increase every year, especially in the two capital increases at the end of 20 16 and in March of 20 17, shareholders contributed nearly 7 billion yuan. In the past seven years, the registered capital of Happy Life has increased to 236.5438+08 million yuan, 274.65438+00 million yuan, 3.330 billion yuan, 3.897 billion yuan, 5.3465438+00 million yuan, 5.630 billion yuan and 6.0654 billion yuan respectively.
However, frequent capital increase has not brought about a significant increase in the solvency of Happy Life. During the three years from 20 16 to 20 18, the core solvency of Happy Life has been hovering in the regulatory warning line, especially in 20 16, and its core solvency is far below the regulatory standard of 100%.
According to the quarterly data, in 20 16 years, the core solvency adequacy ratio decreased from 7 1.4 1% to 58.6 1%, and the comprehensive solvency adequacy ratio decreased from 139.60% to105.7643.000000000005 Both figures are far below the regulatory standards.
After two capital increases at the end of 20 16 and March 20 17, the solvency adequacy ratio of Happy Life was improved in 20 17, and maintained at 107.64% and18 in the third quarter of 20 18.
The quarterly solvency report of Happiness Life in 20 19/kloc-0 shows that its core solvency adequacy ratio is 115.65%, and its comprehensive solvency adequacy ratio is 2 16. 19% and 20/kloc-0.
At present, the biggest good news for Happy Life is to turn losses into profits in the first quarter of this year. According to the financial report, Happiness Life's insurance business income in the first quarter was about 3.9 billion yuan, a substantial increase from 1 1 billion yuan in the previous quarter. In addition, the first quarter also achieved a net profit of 260 million yuan.
However, is this the transformation effect of a happy life or a dead end? With the trend of China's macro-economy and the adjustment of financial supervision policies, state-owned assets have returned to their original sources and focused on their main businesses. How many takers are there?
The growth rate of premium declined, 10 billion yuan was surrendered to the top, stock trading was radical, and it was "abandoned" by shareholders. Where is the next stop of Happy Life? We will continue to pay attention.