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What is "legal nihilism"?
As an important representative of moral nihilism, Zhuangzi constitutes a model of this ethical discussion. Zhuangzi seldom discusses social reality in his works, and avoids and denies moral values in his philosophical thoughts based on human history. On the two levels of first-order morality and second-order morality, Zhuangzi adopted the strategy of taking nature and wandering attitude as moral contents respectively, thus denying pure moral goodness. Although nothingness is probably a profound law of value, this kind of moral nothingness is still too easy to turn from immorality to anti-morality, which makes people self-righteous in the practice of moral thinking and moral psychology.

Moral nihilism; Relativism; Moral value; Moral thinking; Taoist ethics

For quite a few people, moral nihilism is an attractive gesture. When we hold the view of moral nihilism, popular moral concepts will be denied and rejected, and no moral value is important to those empty people. In fact, moral nihilism not only directly constitutes a problem of moral psychology, but also plays an important role in people's moral thinking, so we should see this ethical theory and phenomenon clearly. In the history of thought, perhaps no one put forward such an ethereal philosophical thought in the early days of that era, and Zhuangzi's philosophy constituted an outstanding representative of nihilism.

First, Zhuangzi's nihilism

Zhuangxue is not an academic study with two balanced voices: those who agree and those who disagree. In the study of Zhuangzi's philosophy, those who agree with Zhuangzi argue about subtle issues, while those who disagree tend not to make more comments. This of course stems from the absoluteness of Zhuangzi's philosophy. Theoretically, Zhuangzi's thought is sharp and extreme. If you think Zhuangzi is wrong from the beginning, it will be hard for you to agree with him in the following time. But if you think Zhuangzi is right from the beginning, your recognition of him will basically increase in the following time. This makes Zhuangzi different from those authors with more compatible ideas in the history of philosophy, and also makes the problem more difficult, because it is difficult to speak about Zhuangzi's philosophy except for deeply agreeing with Zhuangzi and standing in the common Zhuangzi. Based on this somewhat complicated angle, this paper will point out the defects of Zhuangzi's philosophy, especially in the field of ethics. Although I also think that Zhuangzi's philosophy is quite basic in other parts, these defects are equally well-founded. If these criticisms can be established, we need to re-examine the role of Zhuangzi's philosophy in ethics and even the whole philosophy itself.

Zhuangzi's philosophy is a kind of nihilism. This assertion is in no hurry. Quite a few researchers agree with this statement, although some defenders in Zhuangzi try to oppose it. Zhuangzi's nihilism has all the features of original nihilism. In addition, Zhuangzi's nihilism is as thorough as his philosophy, which many people don't have. This feature makes Zhuangzi's nihilism not only earlier than other philosophers in time, but also an extremely good specimen. When some of the most famous writers in the history of philosophy, such as Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre, talked about nihilism in the 20th century, Zhuangzi had a profound understanding of nihilism thousands of years ago. Nihilism opposes the authority and value in existing or popular ideas, just like Zhuangzi did. Almost all the core concepts in Zhuangzi's philosophy, such as "inaction", "freedom", "avenue" and "destiny" mentioned by researchers countless times, express this point. At the same time, we should see that nihilism is an ethical concept, especially value science. Philosophical nihilism may only lead to an ideological activity, but in ethics, nihilism will become a serious moral event. Zhuangzi's nihilism constitutes a typical nihilistic treatment of morality, but Zhuangzi's philosophy has not been completely denied in ethics, because nihilism is not completely divorced from morality, and because of its complex characteristics, nihilism will have important and extensive contacts in ethics, whether from the front or from the side.

Li Zehou once mentioned an optimistic view of Zhuangzi's nihilism. Li Zehou thinks that Zhuangzi's nihilism only influenced a few intellectuals in society through the philosophy of mind [1]. It is certainly good to think that nihilism affects people through the mind, but I am not so optimistic about the real situation of Zhuangzi-style nihilism among social members. In fact, nihilism is eroding the moral foundation of contemporary society with amazing intensity, especially now, the seriousness of this situation is realized by more and more people. In recent decades, the crisis of human morality often makes people feel that human beings are really in danger of subversive collapse. Even though the world has developed quite complete communication between knowledge and civilization, legislation and ethics, facts have repeatedly shown that no value has fundamental legitimacy. People seem to be more and more inclined to think that nihilism and non-value are not wrong. If the experience of nihilism is as described above, then Zhuangzi's nihilism constitutes the ancestor of his later nihilism, which is not only thorough, but also has a wide influence. Today, of course, people haven't all read Zhuangzi's philosophical texts, but Zhuangzi's nihilism is manifested in the ideas of quite a few people. I will point out that although Zhuangzi's nihilism has the characteristics of thoroughness and its influence is extensive, people do not have the same degree of weight as Zhuangzi's thought in the thoroughness of nihilism, which makes Zhuangzi's nihilism really produce worse consequences in the field of moral phenomena.

Spiritual freedom is the most intuitive attraction of Zhuangzi's philosophy, and perhaps the first attraction of Zhuangzi's philosophy to readers. This scenic spot is quite rewarding. As all Zhuang scholars have pointed out, Zhuangzi's skill and uniqueness in language rhetoric and philosophical style made his exposition of spiritual freedom and nature successful and deeply captured the readers' hearts. But I will accept the opinion put forward by Wang Bo and others, that is, "the world" is the starting point of Zhuangzi's philosophical research, rather than the "carefree travel" that more people like to think [2]. From the viewpoint that Zhuangzi's philosophy is based on "human life" and related "moral responsibility", it seems that all the arguments put forward by Zhuangzi in his whole philosophy, including spiritual freedom, do not appear out of thin air, but have more realistic origins. I hope to make a supplement here, that is, in fact, many Zhuang scholars who take "carefree travel" as their starting point and center do not deny what the "life" theory thinks.

Second, reject morality.

Once we agree with the viewpoint of "human life", we are very close to Zhuangzi's motivation to explain his Zhuangzi theory, because it is from this source that we can discover and understand the occurrence of Zhuangzi's philosophy and evaluate its rationality more accurately. In addition to this obvious reason, it should also be pointed out that the argument of "human life" makes the ethical part of Zhuang studies more prominent. As Yan Shi 'an thinks, an important motive of Zhuangzi's philosophy is his dissatisfaction with realistic morality. Many researchers in Zhuangzi have pointed out that several famous examples, namely, the fable of Yan Hui, the messenger and the teacher (The Life of Zhuangzi), are always easy to be read by researchers at a certain moment. The core argument expressed by Zhuangzi is that the current morality, especially the morality in political life, is corrupt, dark, hypocritical and hopeless, and it is unwise or even stupid to participate in it with any degree of moral ideal. Thus, Zhuangzi rejected all moral ideals and norms while expressing his moral views, which strongly implied moral nihilism. However, in my opinion, it is not appropriate to quote most of Zhuangzi's examples about the origin of realistic rebellion.

Why? Because Zhuangzi researchers always ignore such a serious fact intentionally or unintentionally, that is, there are almost no moral examples similar to these examples in the full text of Zhuangzi. In other words, these examples are the only part of Zhuangzi's philosophy that directly involves morality. If we see this, I believe that people will not be so easily used to using Zhuangzi's philosophy as a coincidence or interesting ornament to prove and explain that Zhuangzi's spiritual freedom has its very reasonable realistic foundation after all. On the contrary, through these only examples, what we should see is that Zhuangzi did not actually have such a reasonable transition from realism to spiritual freedom. In the common discussion of Zhuang School, Zhuangzi was dissatisfied and profound with the darkness of real politics and real society. Under this condition, Zhuangzi turned to the philosophical space of spiritual freedom. In other discourses, these examples are used to defend Zhuangzi's ethical rationality, and theorists try to show that Zhuangzi's ethics is reasonable after all.

But all these views are extremely wrong. First of all, it is clear that the starting point of Zhuangzi's philosophical discussion should be reconfirmed. What we need to make clear is that Zhuangzi's philosophy did not come into being out of thin air, and Zhuangzi turned to spiritual freedom only after his efforts in real society and real life failed. In addition, it can be considered that if this situation in Zhuangzi is true, then Zhuangzi's starting point and follow-up points will be reasonably defended. However, it is impossible for Zhuangzi's philosophy to have such a defense. Yes, real politics is dark, and social life is cruel in most cases. If interpersonal relationship is not so bad, it may seem disheartened without good practice, but the problem is that this is only the most basic condition in ethical phenomena, which not only does not form the basis of any ethical theory, but more importantly, these common phenomena cannot be used as a reason to oppose morality and give up morality.

To tell the truth, this transformation in Zhuangzi is extremely bad and a failure. This is not only incredibly sloppy and rough, but also unconvincing. This society is indifferent, so we need to become indifferent and arrogant? Real life seems ruthless. Do you want to pursue your own life preservation? From any point of view, the answer can't be yes. However, Zhuangzi gave a clear and affirmative answer. Moreover, these affirmative answers constitute a very important part of Zhuangzi's philosophy. These developments of Zhuangzi's philosophy have never talked about realistic morality like its realistic origin. On the contrary, all of Zhuangzi's pen and ink are concentrated in fiction, fantasy and other parts. As people can see, those parts that occupy almost the whole length of Zhuangzi's novels are the most intuitive attraction of Zhuangzi's philosophy, but the tiny parts about the darkness of reality and moral ineffectiveness are not. When people easily discuss the ineffectiveness of realistic morality, they tend to forget these experiences like Zhuangzi, as if they never existed. In this way, Zhuangzi's seclusion, among Zhuangzi himself and his later supporters, naturally became a reason to oppose WTO entry, benevolence and all morality, but this is wrong. I believe that if Zhuangzi can't get a successful defense in the field of ethics, it will be the most fundamental reason. In addition, the opposition to normative morality has also changed from anti-moral to non-moral. If spiritual freedom is only against general morality, it will not make Zhuangzi so attractive. But while Zhuangzi opposes morality, he also thinks that all morality is irrelevant and low-level, and it will gain incredible appeal in many people's moral values.

Therefore, Zhuangzi's nihilism is in a double sense. Not only did he not see those moral phenomena, but on this basis, he categorically denied and completely rejected any positive imagination about morality. I have also mentioned Zhuangzi's answering strategy of saving lives, which is quite unacceptable. We turn to Zhuangzi's exposition of the immoral part of nihilism. It has been noticed that Zhuangzi's interpreters often demonstrate Zhuangzi's philosophy in depth besides the intuitive attraction of spiritual freedom. This kind of argument generally takes some parts of Zhuangzi's philosophy that are considered to be relatively core and have outstanding theoretical strength as the fundamental starting point. Freedom is one of them, beauty is the other, and they also include other life strategies above freedom and beauty, such as the idea of traveling around the world. I'm not going to explain the highlights of Zhuangzi's philosophy in detail, although it is obvious that they are indeed quite important. In fact, beauty, freedom and Shen Shanzeng's Buddhist interpretation of Zhuangzi's philosophy all constitute an extremely important part of the theorization of Zhuangzi's philosophy. On the other hand, as this article has always wanted to express, Zhuangzi's philosophy should not be without ethics, because although the views on beauty and freedom are increasingly considered to be beyond the moral field and moral philosophy, the relationship between basic morality and basic beauty is still a problem with great room for discussion. Perhaps the reader of Zhuangzi's philosophy is right, that is, Zhuangzi's aesthetic view has formed an overwhelming advantage over many other philosophical theories, but it is too rash to think that this kind of argument and observation can also win in the moral field. Morality is a more basic problem than the field of human beauty and metaphysical freedom. Ethics is important, or morality is important, because politics, economy, law, and beauty and freedom mentioned here are all based on morality and are greatly influenced by the moral field.

There are still quite a few interpreters who believe that Zhuangzi actually has a profound and firm understanding and persistence in goodness [4]. This is a further judgment than that mentioned in the previous paragraph. This view not only affirmed the wisdom of Zhuangzi's philosophy in key places, but also further believed that Zhuangzi actually insisted on goodness. However, I don't think this is a valid view. Even if Zhuangzi insists on something, it is not a kind of goodness, at least not a kind of moral goodness, because if Zhuangzi had a view on goodness, then he wouldn't have asked the parties to retreat morally in such a standard moral situation, instead of acting morally, which is the only situation in Zhuangzi, which makes Zhuangzi completely unable to obtain a reason for his moral insistence.

Third, moral goodness: first-order and second-order

In order to understand these problems more clearly, I will put forward the first-order and second-order explanations of morality. Through this explanation, the moral theory of Zhuangzi's philosophy will become very clear. Although few people put forward it, I still think that first-order morality and second-order morality are not a brand-new concept. In the discussion about justice, some people distinguish between the first order and the second order in the process of justice and moral development. In my opinion, first-order morality and second-order morality are two concepts with great explanatory power in moral philosophy. In order to understand first-order morality and second-order morality, it is necessary to exclude those less pure parts when looking at moral phenomena. In the rest, the first-order morality refers to the true goodness based on the individual, and the second-order morality refers to the more real moral goodness higher than the individual. Intuitively, this division is based on the separation of subject and object, but it brings much more separation than the separation of subject and object.

In addition to putting forward first-order morality and second-order morality, I will add a contrast to Zhuangzi's philosophy in this framework. Not surprisingly, it is Confucianism represented by Confucius. The example of Confucianism seems to be taken for granted. Confucianism and Taoism have never been strange twins in various discussions of China's philosophy. Although this view is good, what I want to point out is a very possible misunderstanding. Let me explain this possible misunderstanding. People may think that comparing Confucianism represented by Confucius with Taoism in Zhuangzi shows that Confucianism is correct in my moral philosophy. This view is not accurate. In fact, although I think Zhuangzi has failed a lot in moral philosophy, I still think that Zhuangzi can certainly provide enlightening theoretical resources for moral philosophy. Even Zhuangzi's nihilism has some inherent rationality. At the same time, is Confucianism correct? This is also a controversial topic. Although there are more supporters of Confucianism than Zhuang Xue in philosophy and ethics, I don't simply think that Confucianism has philosophical and ethical advantages. The advantage of Confucianism over Taoism is a problem that needs serious consideration. No matter what our initial position is and which side we prefer, its answer is likely to be quite different from our intuition. Finally, I want to point out that compared with Zhuangzi, Confucius did put forward a clear concept of obligation and responsibility in his works. From the perspective of moral philosophy, a clear concept of obligation has more advantages than moral nihilism refusal.

The first-order morality and the second-order morality of Confucius and Zhuangzi are different. What Confucius put forward in first-order morality and second-order morality is familiar to people, and human moral goodness and benevolence and righteousness participate in the world constitute their contents respectively. But Zhuangzi's plan should be included, so that it is easy to see where the problem lies. In terms of first-order morality, Zhuangzi's views may not be so easy to unify, because for some unknown reason, Zhuangzi didn't put forward anything about personal moral goodness. Zhuangzi seems to have affirmed the goodness of human life and nature. There must be a certain relationship between the goodness of life and the goodness of nature, but what matters is not the relationship between them, but the relationship between morality and life. Although Confucius did not regard goodness in moral conscience as the content of first-order morality, Zhuangzi insisted on something after all. In terms of second-order morality, Zhuangzi's thought of traveling around the world, which is highly praised by some researchers, is in sharp contrast with Confucius' thought of joining the WTO. Traveling around the world is a rather unique gesture. The uniqueness of this gesture lies not in the fact that it is a reactive choice of social clusters in the process of transforming from the first-order morality of personal health care and letting nature take its course to the second-order morality, but in the fact that it is a fact embodied in Zhuangzi's philosophy of traveling around the world.

In order to better understand this fact, we need to know that Zhuangzi in textual research is not a degenerate as most people think. On the contrary, Zhuangzi in life is actually a person who is confined to details. Zhuangzi's degenerate, just like his philosophy, is only in his mind, within the skeleton. Of course, the pursuit of spiritual freedom rather than formal transcendence is originally its more emphasis and focus. Logically speaking, traveling around the world is not the best solution for Zhuangzi, because the transformation from first-order morality to second-order morality required by Zhuangzi's philosophy is likely to be flatly rejected. Zhuangzi and Confucius are very different in this respect. Confucianism is essentially a second-order morality, and Zhuangzi only needs to adhere to the first-order morality. However, as mentioned at the beginning of this paper, second-order morality is necessary because the social existence of human groups is an unavoidable fact. Zhuangzi fully saw this. Unexpectedly, Zhuangzi skillfully straightened out the inner spirit of the first-order morality in the second-order morality. The idea of traveling around the world is the representative work of this change. Because he is alive, he treats it with a unique "wandering" attitude. Zhuangzi not only complied with the requirements of second-order morality on the basis of maintaining theoretical consistency, but also made the wandering content of second-order morality not inferior to his philosophical insistence on freedom and beauty.

Different from Confucius, Zhuangzi has no clear position on moral obligation, whether it is first-order morality or second-order morality. On the contrary, it is full of value and moral nothingness. It is particularly noteworthy that Zhuangzi has no possibility to realize his philosophical theory, whether it is first-order morality or second-order morality. The reason is the thoroughness and extreme color of Zhuangzi's philosophy. Zhuangzi's extreme argumentation and deduction make his philosophy not only run counter to some fairly firm things, such as the basic morality expressed here, but also deviate from the achievable scope. The individual freedom of the first-order morality cannot be realized, and the wandering content of the second-order morality is directly the expression that the first-order morality cannot be realized in the second stage. But this is not the whole of Zhuangzi's nihilism. Nihilism is recognized by quite a few people because nihilism itself is attractive. In fact, nothingness even constitutes a very important feature of modern social morality. From the perspective of traditional morality, it is a kind of alienation of value. However, because nihilism has invaded the moral field in many ways and gained a more important scope than it should, it is difficult for people to simply refute the rationality of this empirical phenomenon.

Four, several faces of moral nihilism

To some extent, nihilism does have its profound rationality. Zhuangzi's most challenging and profound viewpoint in moral philosophy theory is that any value is relative and divided [5]. When people face all kinds of moral dilemmas, no matter what kind of value position they choose, the result will bring more profound value dilemmas and value divisions. Of course, all events in the world are in a more or less relationship chain, and moral good and evil of course coexist and interact. No matter how much moral idealism is practiced, we can't avoid the argument that moral firmness can't be final because of the split and incomplete value when implementing moral idealism. With the help of this strong relativism argument, no moral value can survive in Zhuangzi's nihilism, and it is Zhuangzi's relativism moral emptiness that embodies the wisdom of Zhuangzi's nihilism. If we understand the moral phenomenon world around us according to the methods and approaches pointed out by Zhuangzi, the situation is likely to be just like what Zhuangzi said. In such a world, there is no value that can ultimately be regarded as reasonable and unified, and the moral foundation is eroded and deeply doubted.

Nihility is an inherent law of value and moral phenomenon. This is the first answer to Zhuangzi's moral nihilism. Although this view is still rejected in many moral philosophies, we must admit it. As moral animals, we not only cultivate some remarkable moral goodness in moral values, but also bring firmness to ethics to varying degrees. On the other hand, nothingness is also a kind of value. Acknowledging the moral value of nothingness is likely to form a part of a deeper moral philosophy theory. At the same time, it is also one of the steps for us to understand Zhuangzi, although it can't make us agree with all the moral viewpoints put forward by Zhuangzi. Just as Mozi went further than Confucius in moral idealism, Zhuangzi demanded more from Laozi in moral nihilism. Zhuangzi almost completely denied and rejected the most indestructible moral goodness in first-order morality and second-order morality, and replaced it with transcendental supreme morality with life freedom and aesthetics as its core. The denial of all morality makes Zhuangzi's nihilism thorough, but Zhuangzi's nihilism scheme constitutes a deeper division of himself.

This is a deeper nothingness. Many supporters and opponents of Zhuangzi will feel that Zhuangzi has not walked out of nihilism, nor can he really walk out of nihilism after providing a refutation of public morality and a description of supreme freedom. MacIntyre has a very incisive view on the possibility of virtue theory. McIntyre commented that Nietzsche's moral nihilism is the root of failure: "Nietzsche not only did not win because he did not argue with Aristotle's tradition;" And more importantly, it is from this traditional point of view that we can clearly understand the fundamental error of Nietzsche's position. " [6] If Zhuangzi's moral nihilism position denies all moral values except Zhuangzi, Zhuangzi's attempt to transcend nihility cannot be realized in any realistic situation, which constitutes a greater nihilism paradox.

The internal reason for this phenomenon is that the transformation from immoral to anti-moral is often easy and makes people feel arbitrary. Like many other moral nihilists, Zhuangzi didn't want to put forward transcendental immoral ideas at the beginning of philosophical thinking. On the contrary, these immoral ideas are developed on the basis of opposing the current morality. However, when opposing morality, Zhuangzi went too far, and it seemed so rash to refute it. From a practical point of view, Zhuangzi's moral nihilism has caused considerable harm.

The influence of this range is not because Zhuangzi put forward the most profound philosophical views, but because of the practical consequences caused by those philosophical views. If people want to directly practice and apply Zhuangzi's nihilism, then the world may not see Zhuangzi's nihilism, which is quite extreme and weird, has some profound internal divisions and conflicts, and needs considerable spiritual training. However, at the empirical level, people can always turn these difficulties or problems into forms with fewer problems. Generally speaking, people's thinking and experience are not as profound as Zhuangzi's, but some parts of Zhuangzi's philosophy are applied in some aspects. This phenomenon, while losing the original weight of nihilism in Zhuangzi's philosophy, enables its nihilism to be realized, but the ways of realization are various and have mixed values. In addition, while being divorced from Zhuangzi's nihilism itself, people's Zhuangzi-style nihilism on the experience level presents more complicated forms. They may be anti-value, worthless or vague.

Zhuangzi provided an authoritative philosophical statement for all supporters of moral nihilism. This nihilism expressed by authority will make people have greater confidence in the understanding and imagination of moral nihility. Like Zhuangzi himself, people will forget it rashly. When we think that moral values are divided and unreliable, and the pursuit of some wonderful freedom and virtue is the truth, we often forget a fundamental fact in ethics, that is, this seemingly immoral transcendental view based on relativism has quietly opposed all moral values, including those pure virtues.