Jinjiniao was founded in 2005. At its peak, it had more than 400 stores in more than 40 cities, with 65,438+0,000 employees and more than 2 million members.
Previously, Jinjiniao was interviewed by the Nanjing Municipal Market Supervision Bureau for reasons such as "excessive prepayment". Previously, in early 2020, the brand was exposed to arrears in employee wages.
The earliest gymnasiums in China can be traced back to the 1980s, accompanied by the emergence of aerobics and aerobics rooms. After 2000, the gym broke out briefly.
According to the data of China Commercial Industry Research Institute, in 20 19, there were nearly 28,000 gymnasiums in first-tier and new first-tier cities nationwide, with 8.79 million members and a market scale of 33.7 billion yuan.
The market scale is not large, but the rising awareness of people's fitness has given this track great imagination. On the other hand, the news of closing stores, closing down and selling themselves in recent years is endless.
This is thought-provoking: what happened to the offline gym? Is this still a good deal?
1928, San Francisco, USA, a 14-year-old boy had no choice but to drop out of school for physical reasons. The next year, he was taken by his mother to listen to a lecture on fitness and nutrition by Paul Bragg, an American pioneer in nutrition. After that, I began to quit sugar, change my bad lifestyle, improve my diet and exercise regularly.
Eight years later, the boy opened the first gym in America in Oakland, California. His name was Jack LaLanne, and later he was honored as "the father of fitness" in America.
This is the beginning of the gym business.
In 1980s, gyms appeared in China. In the past 40 years, domestic gymnasiums have experienced the following three cycles:
Running too fast is not all good.
According to the data provided by the three-body movement, in 20 19 years, the fitness population penetration rate in China was only 4.9%, that in Britain was 14.9%, and that in the United States was 20.3%.
Low permeability restricts the development of domestic fitness industry, and further leads to the essential differences of business models between domestic and foreign fitness industries.
According to the data of China Merchants Securities, in the United States, the profit composition of the fitness industry mostly depends on food, supplements, weight loss consumption, clothing equipment and so on. And the ratio of venue+coach is very small, but in China, the opposite is true. Profits are mainly driven by venues and coaches.
Specific to the gym business, the main income sources of domestic gyms are divided into three parts: membership card sales, private education courses and water bars. Among them, the sales of membership cards are subdivided into different products such as annual cards, season cards, monthly cards and sub-cards, while private education courses include swimming classes, yoga classes, group gymnastics, etc., and water bars account for a relatively small proportion of revenue.
"Membership card+private education" is the main source of revenue, and the pre-sale of annual membership card+private education package sales is the core means of revenue.
In this business model, the ability of a gym to maintain cash flow is directly linked to the sales level.
In the impression of most people, gyms can charge users for one year or more at a time, which seems to be a very profitable business, but it is not the case. There are two reasons:
First, the gym is a heavy asset operation mode. Rent, equipment rental and maintenance costs, utilities, labor management costs, etc. In recent years, it has been on the rise;
Second, the daily operation of the gym relies too much on the cash flow generated by the model of pre-selling membership cards and packaging and selling private education courses. Qiao Lei, who works as a member consultant in a gym in Tongzhou, told the market value list that his gym costs about 200,000 yuan a month, and the average monthly income (membership card pre-sale+private classes) is also at this level.
In the case of monthly balance of payments, the number of members and private lessons that have been sold will not be digested in the future, which actually constitutes the debt of the gym.
This means that once the gym can't maintain the growth number of new members, the renewal rate of old members and reduce the cancellation cycle of private education courses, it is likely to go to the edge of the cliff.
"The decline of California fitness is the beginning of the decline of the entire traditional gym market." Marco Lin, a former employee of the fitness industry, told the market value list.
On July 20 16, the Hong Kong headquarters of California Fitness, founded in 1996, was in financial crisis. Soon, its Beijing branch was stopped on the grounds of "unified content rectification" and eventually closed down.
The decline of the traditional gym market has long been a sign. According to the data of China Commercial Industry Research Institute, from 20 10 to 20 13, the number of fitness clubs in China almost stagnated.
A more cruel set of data is that according to the statistics of China Industrial Information Network, 80% of the commercial fitness clubs in China were basically in a state of maintenance or loss in 20 13. According to media reports, the gross profit margin of the gym industry was as high as 40% around 2002.
In the past ten years, the gym business has changed from making money to not making money. Not only that, after a short recovery around 20 15, the traditional gym went downhill again. What happened?
From 20 10, along the main axis of the development of the times, we can find some clues:
Before 1 and 20 10, the blind expansion and competition of the industry became the main theme in the next few years;
After 2.20 14, the rent and labor costs began to rise, and "industry competition+cost increase" became two major business problems of traditional gymnasiums;
3. From 20 16, Loko, Super Orangutan and keep entered the market with capital and new models, and the rental cost rose sharply again.
Industry competition+cost pressure+impact of new species have become the three mountains that press on traditional gymnasiums.
This industry evolution path, which is constantly superimposed with heavy burdens, is a sieve of the industry. Since 20 16, well-known brands in California Fitness, Jade Bird Fitness, Welsh Fitness, Haosha Fitness, Golden Bird and other industries have all fallen into different degrees of embarrassment. They either seek to sell themselves, or they have no choice but to fall because of the dry cash flow.
Their difficulties and even bankruptcy cannot be attributed only to poor management.
In the 40 years that traditional gyms have gone through, closing doors and rebirth are the norm. People in this industry run gyms, with high or low positioning and large or small scale. Some continue to expand their scale through direct marketing or joining, and some don't even think about it.
But in any case, the core business model of the gym business has not changed, that is, cash flow is mainly obtained through pre-selling annual cards and packaging and selling private education courses for the daily operation of the gym.
In the early stage of the industry, the opportunity of admission is the greatest competitiveness, and this operation mode is effective.
Over time, traditional gyms will inevitably fall into the chain trap of "intensified competition-obvious homogenization-low-price competition-sales volume first-profit compression-industry reshuffle", not to mention that this is an industry with heavy asset operation, and we must also face up to the sharp rise in rent and labor costs.
Not making money or even losing money has become the norm.
Marco Lin said that if we look at the operation of the whole industry from a financial point of view, it is conservatively estimated that more than 90% gyms are losing money.
The ability to continuously obtain cash flow has become an important criterion to measure the operation of a gym, and the ability of a gym to maintain cash flow is directly linked to the sales level, which leads to the sales ability becoming the core competitiveness of traditional gyms. According to Marco Lin, this even gave birth to companies specializing in sales and services.
In the long run, unhealthy trends in the industry were once rampant. A few years ago, some irregularities even recovered the cost through pre-sale after renting the venue and purchasing the equipment, and then ran away with the money.
"Many large-scale gym owners actually don't rely on gyms to make money, but use the cash flow collected in advance to make stocks and do other businesses. They have done everything, and gyms that can't do it will close down." Jeremy Lin told the market value list.
It can't be ignored that when the service ability gives way to the sales level, it will eventually affect the user's fitness experience, resulting in a low renewal rate, which undoubtedly forms a vicious circle.
20 16 is called "the first year of sports industry development" by many people in the sports industry. Focusing on the gym industry, this year, from policies to enterprises to investors, it presents the following characteristics:
1, the government issued a number of strategic documents to encourage the secondary development of the fitness industry;
2. A new gym with private education studio, excellent group class studio and "O2O platform+equipment movement" as the main body has sprung up;
Capital poured into the fitness track with great enthusiasm. China International Sports Investment and Financing Report shows that in the first three quarters of 20 16, fitness startup companies * * * completed 29 investment and financing activities, and the financing amount of more than 20 companies reached tens of millions.
With favorable policies, capital support, mobile internet and new retail, these new species collectively launched an impact on traditional gyms.
They have different concepts, different ideas and different models, but they have the same goal: to either improve or change, and fight their way out in the dead gym market.
Specifically, the private education studio takes the provision of personal coaching courses as its core service, and the venue generally has an aerobic area, an equipment area, a free strength area, a rest area and so on. Boutique group class studio is a fitness space with a single type of paid group class as its core service, and a group training room is generally arranged in the venue. Yoga, spinning, boxing and other typical group classes.
In addition, it is a fitness and sports space with O2O platform and equipment sports as the core service. This place is generally equipped with aerobic area, equipment area, free strength area, rest area and so on. This paper mainly introduces the concepts of internet fitness, 24-hour unattended management, monthly subscription or monthly consumption.
For these models, the market value list is compared as follows for a more intuitive understanding.
The private education studio is more like a pocket version of the traditional gym, but it focuses more on private education courses and enhances service awareness. However, due to the small scale, the cost is reduced and the cash flow is reduced, which is essentially the same as the traditional gym. We don't discuss this problem very much.
The evolution of a number of new gymnasiums, including the boutique group class studio, mainly focuses on: payment mode-"subverting the annual card, no member consultant", fitness content-focusing on subdividing the track, fitness time-24 hours, and time-sharing appointment.
Starting from the needs of users, the traditional gym is essentially a business of renting venues and sports equipment. This extensive business model gives users the right to choose. In the mode of pre-selling members, whether users will come or not, and whether the frequency of fitness is high or not depends entirely on themselves, which also leads to a high proportion of sleep users and a low renewal rate of members in the whole industry.
The new model, which focuses on group classes and private education, also gives users the right to choose, but they separate the needs and divide the venue, time, price and content into small modules for users to freely combine as needed.
In other words, users' needs have not changed in essence. Both traditional species and new species just tell users where and how to practice. The difference is that traditional gyms pay more attention to the former, while new species obviously pay more attention to the latter.
In this case, compared with the traditional gym, the new fitness space is more driven by operation than sales. In the end, it is actually supported by the course content of the group, the tutors of private education courses and online means, which can be summarized as a closed loop of "content attracts users-online means obtains customers-private education service level increases viscosity".
In the business model, the new fitness campaign is actually a shopping mall and sports equipment, which only enlarges the construction of course content and pays more attention to refined operation.
At the same time, under the mode of on-time and pay-per-view, the coach is actually under great pressure, which is directly related to the user retention and renewal rate.
Therefore, we can see that one of the most essential changes in the current gym industry is that the core competitiveness has changed from sales level to course content and coaches' professionalism and service ability.
Traditional gymnasiums are inevitably faced with the pressure of new species diversion and the loss of coaches.
On the other hand, judging from the two original needs of users "where to practice" and "how to practice", the new fitness space is more attractive to fitness white. For them, "how to practice" is a higher priority, but the size and equipment of the venue are not so important.
But for people with rich fitness experience, the demand priority may be just the opposite-they should be the users that traditional gyms strive for.
So in essence, the relationship between traditional gyms and new species is far greater than competition. The traditional gym business is not sexy, but it will not die.
Of course, the traditional gym still needs to be changed. If service continues to give way to sales, then this downhill road will come to an end.
(Jeremy Lin and Qiao Lei are aliases. )
refer to
1. Deloitte Research Institute "2065 438+09-2020 China Fitness Market Development White Paper";
2. Great Wall Prospective Super Orangutan: the retail revolution of gymnasiums, breaking the cage of "fitness gambling", Great Wall Securities;
3. "Fitness Blue Ocean Qian Fan Competition, Demand Pushes Billion Market", Everbright Securities;
4. China fitness industry under the boom, China Merchants Securities;
5. "Is the gym closed this winter? Revealing the hidden rules of the industry for 20 years and solving entrepreneurship;
6. "Thirty years later, domestic gyms are still barely making money", and Chinese businessmen are strategizing;