1In August, 928, the enemy forces of Hunan and Jiangxi were defeated by the main forces of the Red Fourth Front Army in southern Hunan. When they wanted to go back to the end, the soldiers invaded the plain area of Jinggangshan revolutionary base area, and finally attacked Huang Yangjie with four regiments in an attempt to occupy Jinggangshan revolutionary base area in one fell swoop.
Hearing the news that the enemy was about to attack, Chen, the battalion commander of the first battalion, led the first battalion, the first company and the third company to March back to the small well under their control, held a meeting, arranged battles, and carried out intense battle mobilization. The light wounded and sick in the rear hospital asked to return to the front line. Under the leadership of the local government, the Children's League and the Young Pioneers have mobilized, and the Red Guards, riot squads and young women have also actively organized themselves to join the Red Army. The Red Army and the local military package also built bamboo nail arrays, barbed wire fences, fences, rolling stones and bunkers at the Huang Yangjie post, and built five lines of defense. The whole Jinggangshan is ready to crack down on the invading enemy.
On August 30th, when the clouds cleared, four regiments of the Wu Shang Department of Xiang Army and the Jiangxi enemy army began to attack Huang Yangjie. The Red Army commanders and local armed forces used stones, rolling stones, bamboo nails and weapons in their hands to repel the enemy's four charges by virtue of Huang Yangjie's natural barrier. At about four o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy was unwilling to fail and organized a larger attack again. At this time, the Red Army soldiers left 28 repaired mortars in the Ordnance Department of Gongsijun in Ciping, transported them to Huang Yangjie and placed them near the Red Army headquarters. There were only three shell casings. Because of the humidity, the first two shells became squibs. At this time, the third shell popped out of the chamber, only to hear a loud bang and the shell exploded in the enemy group. At this time, young pioneers and children's groups ambushing in the hills lit firecrackers in kerosene barrels and hung red flags on the treetops. At that time, Huang Yangjie guns, red flags fluttered. The enemy's initial information was that the main force of the Red Army was not in Jinggangshan. At this time, he saw this battle and thought that the main force of the Red Army had returned to Jinggangshan. He was terrified out of his wits and fled back to Lingxian overnight.
Afterwards, the Red Army soldiers applied Zhuge Liang's aria in the Peking Opera "Empty City Plan" and made up a lyric: "I was standing on the Huang Yangjie to see the mountain scenery when I heard people coming down from the mountain. I looked up and saw that it was a soldier sent by a thief from Chiang. On the one hand, the peasant struggle is not enough. On the other hand, since the main force of the Red Army has left Yongxin, how lucky you are to have Kangning and Xincheng, why do you dare to invade Wujing? Since you are here to move mountains, why do you want to camp at the foot of the mountain? Don't be indecisive I have no ambush here, and there are no reinforcements outside. Come, come, come, please come to the mountain to talk about the revolution. "I sang" The Empty Mountain Plan "on the Huang Yangjie. On the way back to Jinggangshan with the main force of GongSiJun, Mao Zedong arrived in Huang 'ao and heard the news of the victory of Huang Yangjie Defence War. He wrote the famous poem "Xijiang Moon Jinggangshan" with great enthusiasm, praising Huang Yangjie's victory in the Anti-Japanese War.
Commissioner Mao is resourceful and decisive.
After visiting Jinggangshan, a commander of a Latin American country once praised it meaningfully: "Jinggangshan is a fascinating place. Mao Zedong knows astronomy, but geography. He chose this place, which is a place where hidden dragon crouches tiger-the dragon of China's * * * production party and the tiger of the revolutionary army of workers and peasants. The establishment of this base area is closely linked to the victory of the China revolution. " Dragons can't be trapped on the beach, only by diving into the sea can they stir up the waves; Tigers can't stay in Pingyang, they have to rely on the mountain and have a great impact on the mountain.
1927 10, Mao Zedong led the revolutionary army of workers and peasants to Jinggangshan in Wolong Crouching Tiger and lived there for more than four months. The first rural base of China Revolution was established, which realized the first great turning point of our Party's history.
1928 In May, Zhu De and Mao Zedong joined forces in Jinggangshan, and the strength of the Red Army was greatly strengthened. Wudoujiang, Caoshiao, Long Yuan and other places have won several battles in succession, and the border struggle has entered its heyday. This is manifested in: the main force of the Red Army has been expanded from two regiments to four regiments; The red area includes Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua County and parts of Suichuan, Ji 'an, Anfu and Ling County, and local armed forces have been generally established. Party and government organizations have been established in counties, districts and townships, and the highest leading organs of local party and government-the Hunan-Jiangxi border special Committee and the government of workers, peasants and soldiers have been established in the base areas; A mass movement to fight local tyrants and divide fields has been launched in an all-round way, and farmers' dream of "land to the tiller" has come true.
The reason why the situation developed so fast in this period was that the policies of the border party (local party and military party) were correct. These policies are: "resolutely oppose the enemy, create political power in the middle of the Luo Xiao Mountains, and oppose the agrarian revolution in the escapist separatist areas;" The party of the army helps the development of local parties, and the armed forces of the army help the development of local armed forces; Defend Hunan, where the ruling power is stronger, and attack Jiangxi, where the ruling power is weaker; Vigorously manage Yongxin, create a mass separatist regime, and arrange long-term struggle; Concentrate the cameras of the Red Army to attack the current enemies, oppose the division of troops, avoid the expansion of separatist regions that are broken by the enemy one by one, adopt a wave-like promotion policy, and oppose the policy of aggression. "
Mao Zedong was resourceful and decisive, and correctly chose Jinggangshan as the base for the in-depth revolutionary struggle. It is not that he has Zhuge Liang's unique talent of "observing the astronomical phenomena" and "crafting his sleeve", but that he is good at proceeding from reality and is determined on the basis of in-depth investigation and study on politics, economy and geography of Jinggangshan.
Mao Zedong believes that Jinggangshan has many advantages: First, it has a foundation for the work of the party and the masses since the Great Revolution; Second, there are "greenwood friends" such as Yuan and others; Third, the geographical situation conducive to combat; Fourth, the reactionary rule here is weak; Fifth, it has relatively good economic supply conditions; Sixth, every move here has a great influence on Hunan and Jiangxi. Therefore, Mao Zedong affirmed that Jinggangshan is a good place to develop the revolution because of its pleasant climate, superior geographical position and harmonious people. Mao Zedong, like many great historical figures, unswervingly adhered to his ideals and beliefs even under pressure and punishment. At that time, it was said that it was a "serious political mistake" for him not to attack Changsha after the Autumn Harvest Uprising, so he was dismissed from his posts as Alternate member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and Secretary of the Front Committee. When this decision came to Jinggangshan, he went out of line, saying that he could only be a teacher but not a party representative when he was expelled from the party. Mao Zedong is still fearless. He did not lose heart, did not waver, and unswervingly established rural base areas.
Mao Zedong is a person who "reads thousands of books and follows Wan Li Road". He put forward and implemented the theory of "armed separation of workers and peasants" in Jinggangshan, which is a political line of flesh and blood. The specific contents of this line are: establishing political power in a planned way, deepening the agrarian revolution and expanding the people's armed forces. Accurately speaking, based on the combination of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism and the specific situation of China, he creatively opened up the revolutionary road of China-Jinggangshan Road, which was "the countryside surrounded the city and seized power by armed forces", thus writing the sequel to the China of Marxism-Leninism.
In June of A.D. 1928, while the situation of border struggle was developing day by day, a man named Du came from Hunan. He said that the enemy troops in southern Hunan were "very shaken" and "in a state of panic", and on behalf of the provincial party Committee, they would forcibly pull the Red Army to southern Hunan to attack Chenzhou. Mao Zedong asked him about the mobilization of workers and peasants in southern Hunan, local armed groups and the protection of the enemy. The result is random. How can you get started easily without such basic information? !
The joint meeting of the Military Commission, the Special Committee and the Yongxin County Committee held in Yongxin County at the end of June fully discussed this important issue. At the meeting, Mao Zedong pointed out: "At this time, moving the team to southern Hunan, which is far away from the base area, may cause the danger of' tigers falling in Pingyang and being bullied by dogs'." The meeting decided not to carry out the instructions of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, continue to carry out the struggle to consolidate and expand the Jinggangshan base area, and write a report suggesting that the provincial party Committee reconsider.
However, despite the decision of the meeting and the dissuasion of the Military Commission, the representatives of the provincial party committee took advantage of Mao Zedong's short division in Yongxin to mobilize the masses, and pulled the two main regiments stationed in Lingxian County to southern Hunan to attack Chenzhou. As a result, the two regiments lost half their lives, all the border counties were occupied by the enemy, countless people were killed and houses were burned, which caused the "failure in August" of the border struggle.
In order to overcome blindness and enhance consciousness, Mao Zedong held a meeting of cadres at or above the battalion level of Gongsi Army in Guidong County at the end of August, which examined the harm of subjectivism and summarized the lessons of "failure in August". It is pointed out that "unknown enemy situation", "summer expedition", "leaving the red zone" and "pure military adventure" are the important reasons for this failure. At the end of 1929, Mao Zedong pointed out when summing up the experience since the Nanchang Uprising and the Jinggangshan struggle: "Subjectivism exists strongly in some party member, which is very unfavorable for analyzing the political situation and guiding the work. Due to the subjectivist analysis of the political situation and the subjectivist guidance of work, the inevitable result is either opportunism or blindness. "
Since 1920, Mao Zedong has been tirelessly reading the Manifesto of the Producers' Party and other Marxist-Leninist works. After I came to Jinggangshan, I repeatedly studied some classic military classics. At that time, his most precious possessions were two bookshelves. Whether he moved to the border county or returned to his "hometown" in the base area, he never forgot to bring this pair of "partners". Although he leads a busy life, he still races against time to read all kinds of books and newspapers. The battlefield he assigned to the guards clearly stipulated such a task: after laying a place, he must take the opportunity to collect all kinds of books and newspapers. 1In May, 928, the Red Army attacked Gao Long Wei in Xiachaling County and seized many books and newspapers in Tan Jia, a Kuomintang warlord, among which happened to be the long-awaited Romance of the Three Kingdoms. Mao Zedong praised again and again after reading it: "This is really a clear Wan Li, I am so happy."
Mao Zedong has read all the classic works at all times and all over the world, but he has always adhered to a principle, that is, using Marxism–Leninism's position, viewpoints and methods to solve the practical problems of the China revolution and serve the real struggle. He is completely different from those who believe in the past and can't get rid of old paper, and those who say that they speak Greek and know nothing about China's national conditions. In a word he often said, it is to integrate theory with practice and "shoot the target".
The reason why Mao Zedong had such great courage and courage and resolutely resisted the decision of Hunan Provincial Party Committee to ask the Red Army to invade southern Hunan was because of the in-depth investigation and comparison of the enemy forces in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces. At that time, the Kuomintang army stationed in Hunan had six armies and six divisions, which were not only large in number, but also very effective. The Red Army confronted the Eighth Army of Wu Shang, the Hunan enemy, four times, only a few of them were injured, and the enemy's main force suffered no losses. Although the enemy in Jiangxi has three armies, only three divisions participated in the "suppression" in Jinggangshan. Among them, except Liu Shiyi, the commander of the Seventh Division of the Independent Regiment, who was from duchang county, Jiangxi, all the others were troops transferred from Yunnan by Chiang Kai-shek. After analysis, Mao Zedong came to the conclusion: "Jiangxi has no troops from this province, but troops from other provinces have always been stationed here. Foreign troops are not familiar with the situation of "suppressing * * *" and "suppressing bandits", and they are far less close than the troops in this province, and they are often not very enthusiastic. " Faced with this reality, he formulated and implemented the policy of "taking the defensive in Hunan, where the ruling power is relatively strong, and taking the offensive in Jiangxi, where the ruling power is relatively weak". In other words, we can only defend the enemy forces in Hunan, not attack them; You can take the initiative to attack the enemy forces in Jiangxi and actively promote them; Practice has proved that Mao Zedong's analysis is correct. 1928 In the first half of the year, the Red Army of Jinggangshan fought against the enemy forces in Jiangxi for many times in Suichuan, Ninggang and Yongxin, and won the battle. Destroyed and defeated eight enemy regiments and seized a large number of guns and ammunition, making the enemy in Jiangxi powerless to fight back.
Mao Zedong strategized and won the battle thousands of miles away, relying on the investigation and scientific analysis of the enemy's strength. He flexibly applied Marxist principles, combined with the specific situation of Jinggangshan, and led Jinggangshan's revolutionary struggle to win one victory after another with keen political follow-up and excellent military command ability.
Commissioner Mao sent cotton-padded clothes.
Since its establishment, Jinggangshan revolutionary base area has been under the enemy's military encirclement and suppression and economic blockade, and the life of the Red Army and the people in the base area is extremely difficult. Mao Zedong wrote a report to the Central Committee in June, saying, "There are 5,000 people who have winter clothes, but they still lack cloth. It's so cold that many soldiers still wear two layers of light clothes. Fortunately, I'm used to suffering. And everyone is equally bitter. "
In winter, Jinggangshan is particularly cold. Red Army soldiers have no cotton-padded quilts, only two layers of single clothes and thin thread blankets. In life, each person only has 50 cents of oil, salt and firewood every day, and eats coarse Redmi and pumpkin soup without oil and salt. At night, he keeps warm by straw and has no quilt. In the winter when Commissioner Mao went to Jinggangshan, he instructed the revolutionary army of workers and peasants to set up garment factories in Taoliao and Ciping. Make your own military uniform with local cotton cloth and cloth.
One day, the army issued new cotton-padded clothes, and Commissioner Mao took them back to the Bajiaolou. He walked up to the landlord Xie Huaifu and said, There are five people in your family, and there are no cotton-padded clothes. Please put on this cotton-padded coat! Xie Huaifu saw that Commissioner Mao only wore three light clothes, and remembered that Commissioner Mao only wore a thread blanket on a cold winter night and often worked late into the night, so he refused to accept new cotton-padded clothes. With Chairman Mao doing Xie Huaifu's work many times, Xie Huaifu put on a new cotton-padded coat.
In this way, Commissioner Mao shared weal and woe with the people, overcame the cold winter, won the trust and love of the people, and won the Jinggangshan struggle.
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