The "Decision" of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee pointed out that the reform of the economic system is the focus of comprehensively deepening the reform, and the core issue is to correctly handle the relationship between the government and the market, so that the market can play a decisive role in the allocation of resources and better play the role of the government. To give full play to the role of the government, we must start with the functions of the government. As far as resource allocation is concerned, the main function of the government is to maintain the normal operation of the market and correct the bad behavior of the market. In other words, when the market mechanism fails, the government should stand up to turn the tide and exercise the responsibility of fair and rational allocation of resources.

First, the defects of current government functions in resource allocation.

In a certain historical stage, China adopted the way of government allocating resources. Although with the deepening of China's economic system reform, the way of government allocating resources is getting weaker and weaker, but the mode of government allocating resources has not completely withdrawn. In the current economic transition period, the functional defects of the government in resource allocation are mainly reflected in the "three places" of the absence of government functions, the offside of government functions and the dislocation of government functions. ?

1, the government's function in resource allocation is offside.

Government administrative monopoly reduces the efficiency of resource allocation.

Government monopoly on natural resources leads to high energy consumption. China's natural resources are not abundant, but many natural resources are allocated by the government, the price of resources is low for a long time, and the utilization efficiency of some scarce resources is seriously low.

② The government's policy inclination towards state-owned enterprises in resource allocation leads to unfair competition in the market. Government departments at all levels often engage in various anti-competitive activities through laws, policies and administrative means in the name of industry management or maintaining market order. This kind of administrative monopoly creates invisible "glass door" and "spring door" for the development of private enterprises, which tilts the balance of resource allocation to state-owned enterprises and central enterprises, hinders fair competition in the market and greatly reduces the efficiency of resource allocation.

(3) The government's monopoly on the prices of related products of state-owned enterprises has destroyed the law of market prices. The root of this administrative monopoly lies in the incomplete reform of state-owned enterprises, which makes the separation of government from enterprises incomplete. The government does not supervise some state-owned enterprises in monopoly position according to the rules of market economy, but is often subject to special interest groups representing the power of monopoly enterprises and succumbs to the requirements of some monopoly industries to formulate and maintain monopoly high prices. It causes state-owned enterprises to obtain resources at the lowest cost and sell finished products at high prices, thus obtaining high monopoly profits.

Government rent-seeking activities cause unfair distribution of resources.

(1) In the real society, all resources are in short supply and lack of flexibility in rent. Some of the scarcity of resources are natural, such as land and mineral resources, and some are man-made, such as licenses, quotas, permits, authorization letters, approvals and franchise certificates issued by the government. Rent under natural scarcity can promote the optimal allocation of resources, while man-made shortage of resources will increase the cost of economic activities and lead to unreasonable flow of resource allocation. Under the condition of market economy, there are three common government rent-seeking behaviors: government concession; Government regulations, government tariffs and import quotas; Government procurement.

(2) Officials who have the power of government subsidies can use the power of allocating financial subsidies to set rents at their own discretion. There have been many cases in this field in the past. Some state-owned enterprises, or non-public enterprises close to power, can easily get government subsidies, but the answer is at least uncertain whether such subsidies will definitely improve the operating efficiency of enterprises. Sometimes, government subsidies help to whitewash the financial statements of listed companies; Sometimes, government subsidies are actually distributed between officials with discretion and related enterprises. The appearance of these phenomena will easily lead to "bad money driving out good money", which will make some enterprises lose the motivation to innovate and work hard, and they are keen on opportunism and strive to obtain government subsidies.

2. The government's function in resource allocation is lacking.

The government's administrative monopoly behavior has caused a huge income gap between monopoly industries and non-monopoly industries. Monopoly enterprises here mainly refer to state-owned enterprises. The existence of monopoly will make monopoly enterprises obtain high monopoly profits, which will lead to the difference in profit rate and wage rate between enterprises of different scales, and the income gap between monopoly industries and non-monopoly industries, such as electric power, oil, telecommunications, tap water, gas, railway transportation, tobacco and other industries. They all made high profits by monopoly operation, and their employees also received high salaries, bonuses and welfare benefits. ?

The fiscal and taxation system limits the redistribution of income distribution resources. On the one hand, the tax system makes some people's wealth expand rapidly, on the other hand, it weakens the necessary redistribution ability of the country and is difficult to effectively help the disadvantaged groups, thus increasing the gap between the rich and the poor. ?

The efficiency of government administrative examination and approval reduces the efficiency of resource allocation.

① There are too many pre-approvals, and the market access of many industries requires complicated qualifications and certifications, and the decentralization of administrative examination and approval power is not in place. For example, only 1/3 of the power delegated by the provincial government belongs to the approval of investment projects, which leads to too many approval processes and slows down the progress of resource allocation.

The reform of administrative examination and approval system has not effectively solved the "glass door" problem of private economy, and the market access threshold for private economy to enter monopoly industries is still too high, resulting in unfair resource allocation.

(3) Although nominally part of the examination and approval authority has been transferred to trade associations, the substantive power still lies with government departments, and trade associations generally attach importance to fees rather than services. The inefficiency of government administrative examination and approval greatly affects and reduces the efficiency of resource allocation.

3. The government's functions in resource allocation are misplaced. ?

Due to the overcapacity caused by the interest game, local governments misled the allocation of resources.

① In recent years, in order to pursue GDP, local governments have not only taken measures such as tax reduction, land concessions, financial subsidies, and lowering the price of energy resources, but also relaxed environmental standards and social security standards, seriously distorting the factor price system, bringing severe challenges to overcapacity and misleading the flow of resources. For example, in the case of obvious overcapacity, there are still 16 provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities) that regard steel and 23 provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities) as the key development industries in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan.

? (2) The current financial system makes local governments make decisions that lead to overcapacity and mislead the allocation of resources. Because the tax-sharing reform in China only stays at the financial level, there is no reasonable division of financial power and administrative power among governments at all levels, which leads to the great power of local governments in financial affairs. Under this financial system, local governments naturally tend to choose projects with quick results, large profits, short payback period, fast growth rate and high local fiscal revenue to blindly expand the economy, leading to repeated construction and overheated investment, thus resisting the central macro-control. The most obvious example in recent years is the rising house prices. After several sessions of macro-control by the central government, house prices have not been effectively controlled.

The government ignores the disorder of the supply of public goods and disrupts the allocation of resources.

At present, the overall supply of social public goods is insufficient. In the case of limited financial resources, the government's "preference" and "bias" policies on the supply of public goods have disrupted the allocation of resources.

(1) The supply of social public products is disordered. For some public products that can increase the government's political achievements, there is a high enthusiasm for supply, such as roads and water conservancy infrastructure. Public goods that cannot bring political achievements but can narrow the gap between the rich and the poor are unwilling to provide, or are insufficient. Such as culture and education, medical care and social security.

The duality of urban and rural areas and the imbalance of economic development in central, eastern and western regions have divided the supply of social public goods. For a long time, the government-led supply of public goods has been biased towards cities between urban and rural areas, forming a dual supply system of public goods separated from urban and rural areas: cities and towns implement a public goods supply system based on government supply; In rural areas, the supply system of public goods is mainly based on farmers' "self-supply". However, the supply in the central and western regions and ethnic minority areas generally lags behind that in the eastern coastal areas.

Second, how can the government better play the role of resource allocation.

At present, in order to correct the offside, absence and dislocation of the government in resource allocation and give full play to the role of the government in resource allocation, the following specific measures must be implemented:

1. Implement negative list management and break the government administrative monopoly.

Negative list is a hammer to break private enterprises into the "glass door". Negative list management is an important feature of modern market economy, and it is also an important measure for the government to break the administrative monopoly in the planned economy and give full play to the role of the government in resource allocation.

(1) Negative list management is to implement the principle of investment freedom of "access is not prohibited". In the past, China adopted the positive list management mode, mainly to solve the problem of what enterprises are allowed to do, so the positive list can be infinitely elongated. However, the negative management list only announces the fields and industries that enterprises are forbidden to engage in, and enterprises can engage in all investment projects that are not prohibited by law in management, breaking the phenomenon of uneven resource allocation caused by state administrative monopoly for a long time.

② Under the negative list management mode, the relationship between the government and the market is transparent and inflexible, which is convenient for monitoring and preventing the abuse of government power and rent-seeking, and realizes the Pareto optimal state of resource allocation.

③ Negative list management only lists things that enterprises are forbidden to do, which is often clear at a glance. Under the condition of negative inventory management, most industries and fields can use the registration system without administrative permission and approval, which greatly improves the efficiency of resource allocation. ?

2. Simplify administrative examination and approval procedures and improve the efficiency of government resource allocation. ?

Administrative examination and approval is a legacy of China's long-term planned economy.

(1) Remove excessive government control and complicated administrative examination and approval procedures to make the market alive. The new central government cancelled and decentralized more than 300 administrative examination and approval items in four batches. Since 20 13, private and individual enterprises have increased by 37%, which has effectively promoted the development of private economy, broadened the channels for employment and entrepreneurship, and improved the efficiency of government resource allocation.

(2) Weaken the government's function of examination and approval beforehand and strengthen supervision afterwards. It is necessary to set up all kinds of authoritative, independent and professional supervision institutions, maintain market order through post-event supervision, realize the social equity goal pursued by the government, pay attention to post-event supervision, and improve the reform of administrative examination and approval system.

③ Simultaneously promote the reform of administrative examination and approval and supervision system. The government's reform of administrative examination and approval is not to liberalize enterprises, but to change the way of managing enterprises: from administrative examination and approval to market supervision. Simplifying administrative examination and approval items and strengthening market supervision should be carried out at the same time. While relaxing the market access of private enterprises, market supervision should be formed during and after the event, so as to improve the efficiency of government resource allocation.

3. Transforming government functions and rationalizing the supply of public goods. ?

The transformation of government functions is a fundamental change to give full play to the role of government in allocating resources. Government functions should be transformed from competitive local governments to public service-oriented local governments. Competitive local governments boost overcapacity, rely on land finance and compete with the people for profits, which greatly reduces the efficiency of resource allocation.

(1) The government power list system must be established.

In this way, the improper power of the government to control resources can be restricted and restrained, and the efficiency of resource allocation can be improved. On the one hand, the powers of any government department need to be listed as concisely as possible. On the other hand, the power list must be open, open and transparent. Finally, the power of every level of government and every government department must be subject to public supervision. With the gradual maturity of the power list mechanism, according to the needs of market development, government power projects are constantly deleted to optimize the efficiency of resource allocation. To implement the government power list system, it is necessary to give an agenda list and determine the time limit. The central government should take the lead in implementation and gradually popularize it from top to bottom.

② Increase the total supply of public goods and adjust the supply structure of public goods.

(1) Promote the reform of tax-sharing system.

Reasonably divide the financial rights and powers between governments at all levels, and scientifically determine the financial rights and powers of governments at all levels in the supply of public goods, so that local governments will no longer pursue pure GDP to increase local fiscal revenue, and will no longer allocate resources to areas and industries with overheated investment, but allocate more resources to public goods such as education, social security, medical and health care, and improve the efficiency of resource allocation.

(2) Coordinating the basic supply of public goods.

Get rid of the "dual" basic system and mode of public goods supply in urban and rural areas, as well as the uneven distribution of public goods in the eastern, western and central regions, coordinate urban and rural development and the development of large, medium and small towns, coordinate and balance the eastern, western and central regions, and gradually establish a new modern public goods supply system and system that conforms to international practices, unified planning, unified policies, unified standards and unified treatment.

4. Promote the reform of fiscal and taxation system and strengthen the macro-control function of the government.

(1) Clean up and cancel all kinds of unreasonable financial subsidies and tax incentives. In recent years, governments at all levels have introduced various financial subsidies and preferential tax policies. These policy orientations did stimulate investment, but they went to the other extreme: over-investment and over-investment. The overall surplus of solar photovoltaic industry is a typical example. We should bring fiscal and taxation policies into the scope of macro-control, and gradually clean up and cancel unreasonable fiscal and taxation policies.

? ② Promote the reform of individual tax system, make good use of fiscal and taxation as a macro-control lever, adjust the income distribution gap and improve the efficiency of resource allocation.

? (3) ensure that the proportion of dividends paid by central enterprises is increased, which is open and transparent for social security and people's livelihood.

? Since 20 14, the proportion of state-owned capital gains collected by central enterprises has increased by 5 percentage points, and the proportion is divided into five categories. The first category is tobacco enterprises, with the highest proportion of 25%. The "Decision" pointed out that by 2020, the proportion of state-owned capital gains turned over to public finance should be increased to 30%. But 30% will not be an ultimate proportion, especially for some state-owned enterprises in monopoly industries, there is still room for further improvement. A certain proportion of the new bonuses of central enterprises are used for people's livelihood expenditures such as social security. However, from the current point of view, it takes a long time for the dividend expenditure of central enterprises to be used in social security and other areas of people's livelihood, which is difficult to implement in the short term. It is necessary to disclose these financial expenditures that have been distributed with dividends, so as to make them transparent, open, institutionalized and routine. ?